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Abstract
This paper outlines a monetary model of a production economy
with an explicit role for credit in allocating investment funds to the
agents with the most productive projects. Due to limited commitment,
credit markets are imperfect and collateral is required. This provides
a role for asset prices and borrower net worth in investment decisions.
In particular, the wealth distribution directly aﬀects the productive
capacity of the economy, by inﬂuencing the respective holdings of capi-
tal by agents with high and low productivity. Small, temporary shocks
that aﬀect output or asset prices can have large and persistent eﬀects
on current and future output. The interaction between the wealth dis-
tribution and the productive capacity of the economy has important
implications for the role of monetary policy. Since some of the output
variability is the result of credit frictions, it is not eﬃcient. In con-
trast to standard sticky-price models, it may not be not optimal for
monetary policy to try and achieve the ﬂexible-price level of output.
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11 Introduction
This paper aims to address the following questions. If credit market imper-
fections are an important feature of the economy, how might they aﬀect the
economy’s response to shocks? Furthermore, if monetary policy can inﬂuence
real outcomes in the short run, how do credit market frictions alter the eﬀect
of systematic monetary policy?
Any model to address these questions needs to have the following fea-
tures: a role for credit and a role for monetary policy. To generate a role
for credit in the economy, it is necessary to introduce some imperfection
so that heterogeneity across agents matters. The model in this paper will
feature heterogeneous agents who operate in a credit market where enforce-
ment problems exist, and only a limited set of securities are available. In
such a setting, the distribution of wealth across agents will aﬀect aggregate
outcomes.
To allow monetary policy to inﬂuence aggregate real outcomes, there has
to be some friction, or non-neutrality, preventing instantaneous adjustment
of prices, wages, debt contracts or asset portfolios. My approach is to assume
that product prices cannot fully adjust, but the results of the paper do not
hinge crucially on this particular choice of non-neutrality.
The model economy consists of ex-ante identical entrepreneurs who can
produce intermediate goods using capital, which is in ﬁxed supply (e.g. land),
and a variable input. Using the approach of Kiyotaki (1998), I assume that
some entrepreneurs are more productive than others, but spells of high pro-
ductivity do not last, and arrive randomly. While an entrepreneur is highly
productive, he will want to invest as much as possible in his own technol-
ogy. Entrepreneurs with low productivity, on the other hand, would rather
invest in the technology of high productivity entrepreneurs, as this generates
superior returns. Let us therefore call the entrepreneurs that currently have
high productivity ‘producers’, and the entrepreneurs with low productivity
‘investors’. In principle, investors could lend to producers so that producers
end up applying their technology to the entire capital stock. This would be
the ﬁr s t - b e s to u t c o m e . B u ti ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h e r ea r ec r e d i tm a r k e ti m -
perfections, so borrowing is permitted against collateral. The larger the net
worth of the borrower, the more capital he can buy. Moreover, since capital
serves as collateral as well as a factor of production, an increase in the value
of capital will increase the net worth of a producer who already had some
capital installed and therefore allow him to buy more capital. The model
2also features workers, who provide labour to entrepreneurs. Workers do not
have access to productive technology. They therefore do not hold capital.
This also means that they do not hold any collateral, so they are not able
to borrow. Finally, while entrepreneurs sell their intermediate goods output
in competitive markets, there is a monopolistically competitive sector that
buys intermediate inputs and produces diversiﬁed ﬁnal consumption goods.
It is assumed that not all ﬁnal goods producers can adjust the nominal price
of their output in each period.
In the baseline model, I assume that some fraction of ﬁnal goods pro-
ducers have to set prices one period in advance. Not all prices can therefore
adjust instantaneously, and nominal changes can therefore have short-run
real eﬀects. In traditional models with this type of price stickiness, most or
all of the short-run real eﬀects die out when all agents have been able to
change their prices. But in this model, the redistribution of wealth caused
by any nominal shock will continue to have real eﬀects even after all prices
have adjusted, because the wealth distribution across agents, which aﬀects
aggregate outcomes, only returns to its stationary distribution slowly as pro-
ducers rebuild their share of wealth. Monetary policy therefore works through
wealth redistribution as well as through sticky prices, a powerful mechanism
emphasised by Fisher (1933).
The eﬀect of the wealth distribution on aggregate output works as follows.
Following a shock that reduces current output and/or the price of capital,
the net worth of producers falls by more than the net worth of investors,
because producers are highly leveraged. This means that producers can only
aﬀord to buy a lower share of the total capital stock for production in the
following period. Because capital shifts to those with lower productivity,
this reduces expected future returns, which depresses the value of capital
today, and exacerbates the initial redistribution of wealth from producers to
investors. If the diﬀerence in productivity between investors and producers
is high enough, output falls further in the subsequent period, as the capi-
tal stock is now used much less eﬃciently. The model is therefore able to
generate a ‘hump-shaped’ response of output, i.e. one that gets ampliﬁed
further following the initial shock. It takes time for the producers to rebuild
their share of the wealth distribution to its steady-state level, and output
is therefore below its steady-state level for many periods, even if the initial
disturbance only lasted a single period.
The mechanism described so far is entirely real, i.e. operates even in an
environment where monetary policy has no real eﬀects. So what is the eﬀect
3of monetary policy? Sticky prices reduce the initial redistribution following a
productivity shock: when output is temporarily lower, nominal goods prices
need to rise for a given systematic monetary policy response that does not
fully accommodate the fall in output. But nominal prices cannot rise enough,
because they are sticky, so output increases relative to the case where prices
are fully ﬂexible. So while the direct eﬀect of an adverse productivity shock
is obviously to lower output, the eﬀe c to fs t i c k yp r i c e si st om i t i g a t et h i sf a l l
somewhat. Since the initial output eﬀect is smaller under sticky prices, the
redistribution from producers to investors is also smaller, and the price of
capital will fall by less. The entire credit mechanism is therefore weakened.
Relative to the existing literature on monetary policy and credit frictions,
the modeloﬀers the following insights. First, credit frictions are a potential
source of persistence in the output response to shocks. Such endogenous per-
sistence is usually absent from existing models 1 Note that the persistence
manifests itself as persistent variation in aggregate total factor productivity,
even if actually total factor productivity in the model is white noise. And
unlike models where total factor productivity is entirely exogenous, in this
m o d e la g g r e g a t et o t a lf a c t o rp r o d u c t ivity is driven not only by exogenous
shocks to ﬁrm-level total factor productivity, but by anything that aﬀects
credit and asset prices, such as monetary policy. Second, the fact that credit
frictions aﬀect not only demand, but can aﬀect aggregate supply as well,
has important consequences for the desirable systemic response of monetary
policy to shocks. If credit frictions aﬀect aggregate supply, aggressive sys-
tematic monetary policy can generate an ineﬃciently large output response.
At r a d e - o ﬀ therefore exists between deviations of output from its eﬃcient
level and deviations of inﬂation from its eﬃcient level. Such a trade-oﬀ is
not generally present in traditional monetary models, unless one considers
shocks that hit the price level directly.2
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section (2) presents
1King, Plosser, Rebelo (1999) document the absence of endogenous persistence in the
real business cycle model, and Woodford (2003) and many others discuss the absence of
endogenous persistence in the baseline so-called Dynamic New-Keynesian models.
2In models such as those discussed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003), the level of output that prevails under ﬂexible prices is the appropriate target for
monetary policy, and this level can theoretically be achieved as long as there are no direct
shocks to the price level. For the case of productivity shocks, there is therefore no trade-oﬀ
between output ﬂuctuations from their ﬂex-price level and inﬂation deviations from target.
This is not the case if other frictions are added. For example, Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000) show that a trade-oﬀ also exists both wages and prices are sticky.
4the model in detail. Section (3) outlines the competitive equilibrium. Section
(4) presents quantitative results, section (5) discusses the related literature
and section (6) concludes.
2 The environment
The model features a basic credit frictions mechanism due to Kiyotaki (1998),
which is extended to allow for endogenous labour supply, monopolistic com-
petition and a role for monetary policy.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs. They are identical in terms of
preferences. Their production technology is also identical, up to a produc-
tivity factor, which randomly switches between high (α) and low (γ).D e n o t e
those who currently have high productivity ‘producers’, and those who cur-
rently have low productivity ‘investors’. The productivity factor follows an




nδ 1 − nδ
¸
so the probability of switching from high productivity to low productivity is
δ, and the probability of switching from low productivity to high productivity
is 1 − nδ. This probability matrix implies that from any initial distribution,
the distribution will converge to a stationary distribution with a ratio of pro-
ductive to unproductive agents of n. In addition to the random ﬂuctuation
that each agent experiences between high and low productivity, there are ag-
gregate productivity shocks, which aﬀect all agents equally. To reﬂect these
aggregate ﬂuctuations I will put a time subscript on the productivity levels,
αt and γt.






























The variable ct denotes consumption, xt denotes a non-durable input (eg
inventories), kt denotes durable capital, wt denotes the wage paid, lt denotes
the quantity of labour employed, bt+1 denotes the amount of real borrowing
taken out at time t and repayable at time t+1,a n dqt is the price of capital.
It is assumed that producers do not consume their output directly, but sell
it to a monopolistically competitive retailer, who then oﬀers the diversiﬁed
goods back to producers, investors and workers with a markup of ϕt.A l l
variables are denominated in terms of a consumption index. Deﬁne a Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods of type z ∈









The corresponding price index, deﬁned as the minimum cost of a unit of








For simplicity, it is assumed that inventories are costlessly created from
the consumption goods and used in the same Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, so
that their relative price in terms of the consumption index is 1.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), borrowing constraints are inter-
preted as follows: it is assumed that when an entrepreneur has installed
some capital, he invests some speciﬁc skill into that capital to generate out-
put. The total value of his project is therefore the next period resale value
of the installed capital plus the value of the output that can be generated
using his speciﬁc skill. But he cannot commit to investing his speciﬁc skill:
once the capital is in place, he can always choose to walk away. Because
of this inability to commit to full repayment, the investor will never lend
6more than the resale value of capital. It is assumed that, should the value
of collateral fall short of what was expected at the time the loan was taken
out, the entrepreneur still repays the borrowing in full, because by the time
he ﬁnds out about the realisation of the aggregate shock, he has already
produced, and no longer has the opportunity to walk away.3 Also following
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), it is assumed that, after the initial uncertainty
about aggregate productivity is resolved, agents assume that future aggre-
gate productivity is constant. In other words, their decisions are assumed to
be unaﬀected by aggregate uncertainty. This certainty-equivalence principle
can also obtained if a quadratic utility function is considered. I do not take
this route, however, because I want to exploit particular functional forms to
obtain very simple decision rules, which are exact if there is no aggregate
uncertainty, and which will be a reasonable approximation if aggregate un-
certainty is small. Although in such an environment agents are not strictly
evaluating the mathematical expectation of variables with respect to the dis-
tribution of aggregate shocks, I will retain the mathematical expectations
notation to highlight which variables are not known at time t.
It is useful to deﬁne ut ≡ qt − Et
qt+1
rt , the user cost of a unit of capital.
If we assume the borrowing constraint is binding, which will be veriﬁed
later, we can rewrite this problem as











1 − η − σ
¶1−η−σ
+qtkt−1 −bt
To solve this, we break up the problem into two steps. First, given last
period’s capital and intermediate goods, what is the optimal demand for
labour?

















This leads to the ﬁrst-order condition













3He could still have an incentive to walk away if the the debt burden exceeds not only
the value of his collateral, but exceeds the value of his collateral plus current output. It is
assumed that shocks are never that large.
7w h i c hc a na l s ob ew r i t t e ni nt h ef a m i l i a rf o r m
wtlt =( 1− η − σ)
yt
ϕt
The maximised proﬁt after paying for labour input is therefore
πt =( η + σ)
yt
ϕt
For the second step of the producer’s problem, we analyse what combina-
tion of capital and inventories he should buy to minimise expenditure, given
a desired level of proﬁts.




Let λt denote the Lagrangian multiplier on the proﬁt constraint. Substi-
tuting the optimal level of labour demanded into the production function,

























































Note that λt is the resource cost of another unit of proﬁt, or, in other
words, 1/λt i st h er e t u r no na ni n v e s t m e n to fzt.F o rc o n v e n i e n c ew ed e ﬁne


















Substituting these optimal labour demand and factor demand conditions
into the production function, we can now write the budget constraint as
ct + zt = r
p
t−1zt−1 + qtkt−1 − bt
This can be interpreted as a savings problem with uncertain returns (eg
Sargent (1987)). The optimal decision rules for consumption and investment
are linear in wealth:
ct =( 1− β)(r
p
t−1zt−1 + qtkt−1 − bt)
zt = β(r
p
t−1zt−1 + qtkt−1 − bt)
2.1 Investors
Let lower-case variables with a prime denote the choices of an individual
investor. The labour demand conditions facing the agents with low produc-
tivity, i.e. the investors, are the same as those for the producers, so the
maximised proﬁts after paying the wage bill are
π
0




The second step of the problem, minimising the expenditure on x0
t and
k0


















Using our earlier deﬁnition of ut, this problem is again parallel to that


















9The decision rule for investors is therefore
c
0
t =( 1− β)(r
i















Retailers buy output and use a costless technology to turn output goods into
diﬀerentiated consumption or input goods, which they sell onwards. The sep-
aration of producers and retailers is a modelling choice similar to Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and is chosen to introduce monopolistic com-
petition while maintaining tractable aggregation of producers. If producers
operate directly in monopolistically competitive markets, the choice of the
input ratio xt
kt depend on the individual output level, which greatly compli-
cates aggregation across producers and investors. Per period real proﬁts for

















words, ϕt is the retail sector’s average markup. Retailer output is denoted
yR
t (z).

























I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a ts o m ef r a c t i o nκ of retailers must set
their price, p2,t(z), one period in advance, while the remainder can change
their price, p1,t(z) each period. Each type of retailer maximises proﬁts, lead-


























The term Λt−1,t is a discount factor applied at time t−1 to proﬁts earned
at time t. It is assumed that retailers are owned by workers, so it is the











I will end up working with a linearised model, and it is convenient to
note already that the ﬁrst-order conditions for retailer proﬁt maximisation,
combined with the evolution of the aggregate price level, once linearised, will
give the following pricing equation:




where b xt ≡ xt−x
x denotes proportional deviations from the steady-state.
In an extension of the model, I consider an environment where retailers
face opportunities for price changes that arrive randomly, so that price set-
ting follows a discrete time version of the model proposed by Calvo (1983),
as described, for example, in Woodford (1995), Yun (1996), Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999) and many others. The implication is that actual prices
can deviate from their optimally chosen level for more than one period fol-
lowing a shock, which allows for richer inﬂa t i o na n dm a r k - u pd y n a m i c s .T h e
probability for each retailer of being able to reset their price equals (1 − κ)
in each period, and is independent of when the last price change occurred.









where Λs,t is a discount factor applied in period s to proﬁts expected in
period t,a n dp∗
s(z) is the optimal price chosen. Retailers are owned by work-
ers. It is assumed that retailers (but not entrepreneurs) form a cooperative
that redistributes income between those who were able to change their price
11and those who were not able to do so. This assumption implies that retailers
do not face idiosyncratic risk. This in turn implies that all retailers who are
able to change their price will set the same price, regardless of their history.
This greatly facilitates aggregation across retailers.
The ﬁrst-order condition for retailers who are able to change their price































The linearised aggregate pricing condition now becomes:
b πt = βEtb πt+1 −




There is a set of agents in the economy who have no access to productive
technology, but who can work for the producers and investors. They derive





















= wtlt + b
w
t + Πt
where lt is the fraction of time spent on work, and Πt are the proﬁts from
the retail sector, which is owned by the workers. Setting the marginal utility





It is to be veriﬁed later that the interest rate on bonds is below the rate of
time preference 1/β. This implies that, near the stationary state, the workers
12will choose not to hold any bonds, and simply consume their wage and proﬁt
income. Their consumption therefore becomes:
c
w
t = wtlt + Πt
2.4 Monetary authorities
Prices in the economy are set in money terms. As described in Woodford
(2003), it is not necessary for agents to have a well-behaved demand for
money balances in order for the monetary authorities to have control of the
nominal interest rate. All that is necessary is for agents to have some, pos-
sibly inﬁnitely small, demand for money balance. I assume such a ‘cashless
limit’ (Woodford (2003)) here, so that money balances, and therefore the
central bank’s balance sheet, approach zero. Given this assumption, it is a
reasonable approximation to omit money from the agents’ utility function
and budget constraint. A similar approach is used, for example, by Aoki
(2001) who also omits money balances from a model that allows the central
bank to set nominal interest rates. The central bank simply announces the
one-period nominal interest rate Rt,w h i c hm e a n st h a ti ts t a n d sr e a d yt o
deposit or lend any amount4 the private sector desires at this rate, subject
to a (inﬁnitely small) spread. The spread ensures that the private sector
will attempt to clear the loan market ﬁrst without resorting to the central
bank. The inﬂuence of the central bank on the market for loanable funds is
therefore unrelated to the amount of base money, but instead works via arbi-
trage with the private market for loanable funds. No private agent would be
willing to borrow at a rate higher than that oﬀered by the central bank, and
no private agents would deposit funds that receive a lower return that that
oﬀered by the central bank. This arbitrage mechanism is similar to the way
actual monetary policy operates in countries such as New Zealand, Canada,
the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries, although in practice the
spreads are of course not inﬁnitely small. This environment gives rise to an

















4The central bank does not have better enforcement mechanisms for the collection of
loan repayments than does the private sector. It will therefore not lend any funds to a
producer who is already at the binding borrowing constraint.
13The central bank is assumed to follow a simple rule for setting monetary
policy, for example by responding to current inﬂation. There are also random







We now look for a competitive rational expectations equilibrium for this
model economy. This will consist of aggregate decision rules for consumption,
investment, labour supply and asset holdings, and aggregate laws of motion so
that market clearing and individual optimality conditions hold. Because the
distribution of wealth directly aﬀects aggregate outcomes, it becomes a state
variable. As will be shown, the distribution of wealth can be summarised
by the share of wealth owned by producers. While in model simulations we
will consider a stochastic process for aggregate productivity αt and γt,w e
look for a certainty-equivalent equilibrium, in the sense that agents behave
as if they expect aggregate exogenous random variables to be ﬁxed at their
mean values in the future. Let capital letters denote aggregate variables.









and that labour supply equals labour demand. For the goods market, the
following must hold. It is assumed that each retailer buys a single output
good, turns it into a single diversiﬁed consumption/inventory good and sells




Recall that aggregate output is given by the sum across all identical out-




















In general, it is not the case that Y R
t = Yt + Y 0
t, but this will be true
in a neighbourhood of the steady state. It is understood that the following
condition only applies in such a neighbourhood:
Ct + C
0



















Note that the individual decision rules for consumption and investment are
all linear, so that we can simply sum them to obtain aggregate decision rules
and laws of motion:
Ct =( 1− β)((η + σ)
Yt
ϕt
+ qtKt − Bt)
C
0



















where the bond market clearing condition has been used, together with the
fact that workers will hold no bonds near the steady-state. The following is
asserted, to be veriﬁed later: I am interested in equilibria near a steady-state
where the investors hold some capital. This has two implications. First,
i n v e s t o r sm u s tt h e nb ei n d i ﬀerent between holding capital for production












it follows that the borrowing constraint is indeed binding near the steady-
state, since producers achieve a larger return on their own productive invest-
ment than the interest rate they have to pay on the bonds they issue.
Along the certainty-equivalent path, using the fact that the borrowing













N e x t ,i ti su s e f u lt od e ﬁne aggregate wealth as
Wt ≡ Zt + Z
0
t















Using the Markov-process for the way agents switch between having high
and low productivity, the law of motion for the share of wealth can be written
as
st+1 =
(1 − δ)Zt+1 + nδZ0
t+1
Wt+1
This can be simpliﬁed to
st+1 =
(1 − δ)e αt+1st + nδe γt+1(1 − st)
e αt+1st + e γt+1(1 − st)
(1)
where e αt+1 = α
1
η+σ
t+1 and similarly for e γt+1.
16Using the expressions for ri
t and r
p
t derived earlier, the law of motion for
wealth can be written as











To complete the model, we use the aggregate budget constraint, substitute
the decision rules for consumption, investment, labour, and use the fact that
Wt =( η + σ)(
Yt+Y 0
t
ϕt )+qtK. This can be then be written as two equilibrium
conditions linking the user cost and the wage to wealth and asset prices:
























The asset pricing equation is given by






















We now need to complete the model by adding a set of equations describ-
ing the role of monetary policy. Note that the arbitrage equation for nominal












Note that ut and wt can be eliminated using (3) and (4), and rt can be
eliminated using (6). This leaves a system of 4 dynamic equations (1),(2),(5),
(7) in {st,W t,q t,π t} , 3 initial initial conditions








W0 =( η + σ)
µ









The stochastic processes for the productivity of producers and investors
a r ea s s u m e dt ob ei d e n t i c a l ,s ob αt+1 = b γt+1and they follow an autogressive
process:
b γt+1 = ρb γt + εt+1 (11)
4 Model solution
4.1 Dynamics
The system of 4 equations and 3 initial conditions is solved as follows. First,
we take a linear approximation of all the equations around the steady state.
The steady state is the level that aggregate variables tend to when there are
no aggregate shocks. Associated with these levels for aggregate variables is a
stationary wealth distribution summarised by the share of wealth owned by
producers, st = s.
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
This system can then be written as:
Xt+1 = FX t (12)
18where F = A−1B.
Using a simple eigenvalue decomposition of F = PΛP−1 this can be
written as a new system
Yt+1 = ΛYt
where Yt = P−1Xt. This system is ‘uncoupled’ as Λ is a diagonal matrix
containing the eigenvalues of F. I am interested in non-explosive, determi-
nate solutions. Order the eigenvalues in decreasing absolute magnitude, and
let n be the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle. Let P
−1
1 denote
the upper n rows of P−1. For a solution to be non-explosive, it is necessary
for P
−1
1 Xt to be zero for all t. For a solution to be determinate (following
Blanchard and Kahn (1980)), it is necessary for n =2eigenvalues (corre-
sponding to the number of ‘jump’ variables qt,π t) to lie outside the unit
circle and for the remaining eigenvalues to lie inside the unit circle. After














where P21 denotes the ﬁrst n rows and the left (5 − n) columns of P,
and P22 denotes the bottom right (5 − n) × (5 − n) block of P. Given this
relationship, the initial response to any shock at time 0 can be found by
substituting out the jump variables from the system of initial conditions,
which can then be solved for c W0, b s0, b ϕ0. This then gives the initial response
to a shock. From the dynamic system (12), again with the jump variables
substituted out using (13), the remaining dynamic path of all the variables
can be computed, noting that b ϕt =0 ,∀t > 1.






(1−δ)e α−e γnδ−(e α−e γ)s
e αs+e γ(1−s) ,
η(1+τ)
τ+η+σ,ρ.So for a monetary policy
that satisﬁes the Taylor principle of reacting to inﬂation by a factor greater
than 1, this system has a non-explosive, determinate solution. [discuss con-
ditions on other eigenvalues]
4.2 Steady state
The full steady state of the model is given in the appendix. However, it is











Since s is the share of wealth owned by the productive agents, and I want
to consider the model near a steady-state where productive agents do not
hold all of the capital stock, s<1. This in turn means that the real interest
rate is strictly lower than the (inverse of) the rate of time preference. At
these low interest rates, workers will not wish to save, so workers choose not
to participate in the ﬁnancial asset market. This proves the earlier assertion
that workers simply consume their wage and proﬁt income in each period.
4.3 Frictionless model
Before turning to the properties of the full model, I show what the proper-
ties of the model would be without binding borrowing constraints. In that
case, the eﬃc i e n ta l l o c a t i o nw o u l da l w a y sb er e a c h e d ,i nt h es e n s et h a tt h e
most productive agents would always hold the entire capital stock. The full
derivation of the model is given in the appendix. I state here the law of







where c denotes a constant term. This implies that output dynamics
are entirely driven by the exogenous process for aggregate productivity and
lagged output. There is no feedback from any net worth or asset price variable







η + σ − ηβ
ϕ(1 − β)
Yt
So asset prices and entrepreneurial wealth are simply proportional to
output.
204.4 Calibration
The model contains 13 parameters. Some of the parameters are standard,
in the sense that they can be chosen to match key steady-state ratios in the
economy. Other parameters, in particular those speciﬁc to the credit mecha-
nism, are more diﬃcult to assign values to. The calibration I have chosen is
designed to show how the mechanism might work, not how it most likely does
work, as there is little guidance from actual observation in choosing plausible
values for these parameters. The following parameter values are chosen for














The model is calibrated so that each period can be interpreted as on
quarter of a year. The discount factor β =0 .99 is a standard choice in many
general equilibrium macromodels (see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995)). To-
gether with the other parameters in the model, it results in an annual real
interest rate of just under 4%. The values for η,σ,τ,χ,γ were chosen to
achieve a capital to output ratio of 10, a labour share in output of 0.6, hours
worked of 0.31 as a fraction of total available time, and a wage elasticity of
labour supply of 2, values very close again to those in Cooley and Prescott
(1995). The monetary policy reaction function parameter λ is set at the
value used by Taylor (1993), although the reaction function does not have
exactly the same form. The rule used in this paper is certainly too simplistic
to be realistic, and is for illustrative purposes only. The elasticity parameter
θ determines a steady-state net mark-up for consumption goods of 0.10, cor-
responding to the empirical ﬁndings by Basu and Fernald (1997). The share
21of prices that are set one period in advance, κ, is set at 0.5. In the extended
model, which features staggered pricing, the probability for each ﬁrm of not
being able to reset their price is 2/3, implying that ﬁrms change their price on
average every 3 quarters, in line with the estimates in Sbordone (2002). The
extended model also features a more realistic monetary policy rule, which is
necessary in order to obtain plausible inﬂation dynamics.5 The form of the
rule in the extended model is
b Rt =( 1− ρR)λπb πt +( 1− ρR)λϕb ϕt + ρR b Rt−1 + εR,t (15)
In other words, monetary policy now responds gradually to inﬂation, and
also responds to the mark-up, which is a proxy for the deviation of output
from the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices (when the
markup is constant). The calibrated values for {λπ,λ ϕ,ρ R} are {1.5,2,0.9}.
The crucial parameters for the strength of the credit mechanism are the
productivity diﬀerence between producers and investors α/γ, the steady-state
ratio of productive to unproductive agents n, and the probability of a highly
productive agent becoming less productive, δ.T h e p a r a m t e r s n and α/γ
were chosen so that productive agents hold about 2/3 of the capital stock
in steady state, the same value as that in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). But
other combinations of these parameters could achieve the same ratio, and
generate either more or less persistence. The parameter δ was chosen to be
low enough so that the credit mechanism generates substantial persistence,
while still producing model responses that appear well behaved.
4.5 Response to aggregate productivity shock
In this section I consider the response of the model economy to aggregate
productivity shocks. I compare these responses with the responses of a ‘ﬂexi-
ble price’ version of the model (with κ =0 ), and also with the response of the
fully eﬃcient model, outlined in section (4.3). Figure 1 shows the response of
output, the price of capital, and aggregate entrepreneurial wealth response.
The units on the vertical axes are percentage deviations from steady state.
5For a monetary policy rule that only reacts to contemporaneous variables, a monetary
policy contraction causes a rise in inﬂation, because the ‘supply’ eﬀect of the reduction
in future aggregate productive capacity dominates the ‘demand’ eﬀect of the monetary
policy shock. By making the policy rule more gradual, the policy contraction is longer
lasting, and the demand eﬀect is stronger.
22The units on the horizontal axes are quarters, with the shock taking place
in quarter 1. The productivity shock is a 0.25 per cent fall in aggregate
productivity, which lasts only for a single period. In other words, aggregate
productivity follows a white noise process. Output in the eﬃcient model falls
by about 1.7 times the fall in productivity, which is the combined eﬀect of
lower productivity and lower labour inputs. After the shock, output returns
fairly quickly to its steady state value. We know from equation (14) that,
if productivity follows a white noise process, the persistence of output, mas
measured by the autocorrelation coeﬃcient, is equal to
η(τ+1)
τ+η+σ. Using the
baseline calibration, this is equal to 0.17. Asset prices and aggregate wealth
respond with the same proportional magnitudes as output. For the ﬂexible
price model with credit frictions, the initial output response is the same as
the eﬃcient response, because all determinants of output other than labour
(i.e. last period’s borrowing decision, the share of capital held by productive
agents, and investment in inventories) are predetermined. But note that the
asset price falls more than twice as much. This ampliﬁcation is due to the
following mechanism. In period 1, producers and investors experience an
unanticipated loss of output, as well as an unanticipated reduction in the
value of producers’ collateral. This means that in period 1, producers can-
not maintain their share of the capital stock: they can now aﬀord less than
the steady-state share, because they buy capital with the reinvested share of
output and with collateralised borrowing. This means that capital will be
less eﬃciently used for production from period 2 onwards. Because today’s
capital price is the present discounted value of all future marginal returns to
capital, which will fall by more in the credit-constrained economy, the price
of capital falls by more than in the eﬃcient model, and this fall further ex-
acerbates the reduction in producers’ net worth. Output in period 2, rather
than returning to steady-state, falls further due to the shift in capital from
highly productive to less productive entrepreneurs. After period 2, it takes
time for the most productive agents to rebuild their share of wealth, and it
therefore takes time for asset prices and output to return to their steady-state
values.
In the full model, with sticky prices as well, the initial fall in aggregate
output is slightly muted relative to the eﬃcient and ﬂexible price models.
As output falls, the nominal price level needs to rise for any given monetary
policy stance that does not fully accommodate the output fall. But prices are
sticky, so they do not rise enough. This causes the real marginal cost of the
retail sector to rise, as not all retailers are able to charge their desired markup.
23For the entrepreneurs, however, the paying a lower markup is beneﬁcial: it
increases the value of their output in consumption terms, which in turn
increases the amount of labour they want to hire, relative to the amount
of labour they would want to hire with constant markups. This mechanism,
while appearing perhaps non-standard, is simply the New Keynesian channel
whereby those who cannot change prices change output to meet demand,
if we consider the entpreneurs and the retailers are one single sector. So
aggregate output falls by less in the period of the shock. This has important
consequences for output dynamics in future periods. Because output falls by
less, there is a smaller redistribution of wealth from producers to investors.
There is therefore a smaller response of asset prices and aggregate wealth,
because less of the capital stock shifts from producers to investors during
the transmission of the shock. The entire credit - asset price eﬀect has been
dampened by the stickiness of prices. The response of inﬂation, nominal
interest rates and the markup in the sticky price model are shown in ﬁgure
2.
Does this eﬀect depend on the particular modelling choice of paying retail
proﬁts to workers? After all, if proﬁt so ft h er e t a i ls e c t o rw e r et ob ep a i d
to entrepreneurs, there would be an oﬀsetting eﬀect: the beneﬁcial eﬀect on
entrepreneurs’ net worth of the fall in markups would be oﬀset by the adverse
eﬀect of the fall in retailer proﬁts that are paid back. But the quantity
of labour demanded by entrepreneurs would still push output towards oﬀ-
setting the eﬀect of the productivity shock, because it is not aﬀected by the
ﬂow of proﬁts, only by the marginal product of labour. So net worth of
entrepreneurs would still fall by less than under ﬂexible prices, although the
diﬀerence would be smaller, because the direct eﬀect of the change in markup
and the change in proﬁt would cancel eachother out.
The key diﬀerence, relative to standard sticky-price monetary models, is
that the ﬂexible price fall in output from period 2 onwards following an ad-
verse productivity shock is no longer eﬃcient, that it does not correspond to
a social planner solution. This can be seen from the fact that the no-frictions
level of output, which corresponds to a social planner solution in the absence
of all frictions, lies strictly above the ﬂexible-price level of output from pe-
riod 2 onwards. In standard sticky-price monetary models, it is considered
desirable for monetary policy to respond aggressively to inﬂation following
a productivity shock, as this will simultaneously reduce inﬂation and ensure
that output follows the same path as a model without price stickiness. In
those models, as soon as productivity has returned to its steady-state level,
24so does the ﬂexible price level of output. But in the credit frictions model
considered in this paper, only the initial fall in output is an eﬃcient response
to a change in aggregate productivity. The subsequent further fall, and the
slow return to steady state are the result of ineﬃciencies in the credit market.
How large the dampening eﬀect of sticky prices will be depends on how
aggressively monetary policy responds to inﬂation. As the adverse produc-
tivity shock puts upward pressure on inﬂation, the monetary policy reaction
function dictates that the nominal interest rate should rise. The more aggres-
sive the rise in interest rates, the smaller the resulting increase in inﬂation,
and the smaller the reduction in mark-ups. As monetary policy becomes
suﬃciently aggressive in its response to inﬂation, the economy’s response
to productivity shocks approaches that of the ﬂexible price economy, where
markups are constant.
4.6 Response to monetary policy shock
Figure 2 shows the model economy’s response to a temporary white noise
shock to the monetary policy rule, where the model now features staggered
prices and the monetary policy rule (15)6. The shock is calibrated to cause
a 0.25 per cent rise in the annualised nominal interest rate. The discussion
here is brief, because most of the mechanism is similar to that in the case of
a productivity shock. Only the initial cause and transmission of the distur-
bance diﬀers. Nominal interest rates rise in response to the shock. Because
retailers are unable to lower their prices suﬃciently in response to the mon-
etary contraction, their markups rise. Entrepreneurs therefore face a fall in
the consumption value of their output, which reduces net worth both via
ad i r e c te ﬀect of the markup and via a further reduction in labour inputs.
Because of the leverage eﬀect, producers suﬀer a larger fall in net worth
than investors, and once again the wealth distribution is shifted from those
with high productivity to those with low productivity. This lowers return
on capital in future periods, which causes a fall in the price of capital today,
resulting in a further reduction of net worth. Output in the following period
is lower still, because capital is now being used less eﬃciently. The return
to the steady-state happens gradually, as producers rebuild their share of
wealth, so that the wealth distribution returns to its stationary distribution.
6For completeness, the response of this staggered pricing version of the model to pro-
ductivity shocks is given in ﬁgure 3.
25Note that in this case the eﬃcient path of output remains constant, because
monetary policy would have no eﬀect in this model absent sticky prices.
5 Related literature and further discussion
[to do]
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998),
Kocherlakota (2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997,1998,2000,2001), Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Iacoviello (2002), Cooley and Quadrini (1999),
Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001).
Autocorrelation properties of output (King, Plosser, Rebelo and Cog-
ley and Mason). Shocks to future productivity. Nominal contracts. State
contingent borrowing and the optimal contracts literature. Total factor pro-
ductivity.
The simulations presented in this paper are for a linearised version of the
model, in the neighborhood of a steady state with a binding borrowing con-
straint. But the process driving the model implies a potential asymmetry.
If enough borrowing is allowed in the economy, or many agents experience
as u ﬃciently long spell of high productivity, the economy can reach an un-
constrained steady-state. In this steady-state, the wealth distribution still
ﬂuctuates in response to shocks, but no longer causes any feedback to real
outcomes. Productive agents who experience a small enough negative shock
can still borrow enough so that they achieve their desired level of investment
w i t h o u th i t t i n gt h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r aint. The economy’s response to small
negative productivity and monetary policy shocks will be small and tran-
sient. Positive shocks to their net worth, no matter how large, will never
result in hitting the borrowing constraint. But if any of the adverse shocks
are large enough, they can cause the borrowing constraint to become binding
again. In that case, the wealth distribution will once again feed back to the
real economy, and the response to both negative and positive shocks will be
larger and more persistent. The intuition for this asymmetry is similar to
that in Kocherlakota (2000), although his model is much simpler.
266C o n c l u s i o n
I have outlined a macroeconomic model where credit markets operate less
than perfectly due to enforcement problems, and I have used this model to
discuss the interaction between aggregate output dyamics, the wealth distri-
bution and the eﬀect of monetary policy. None of the building blocks of the
model are new. The idea that monetary policy works through a redistribution
of wealth between highly productive and less productive agents is very much
i nt h es p i r i to fF i s h e r( 1 9 3 3 ) .T h en o t i o nt h a tt h en e tw o r t ho fa g e n t sa ﬀects
the quantity of investment is a common theme in the macro-economic ‘credit-
channel’ literature, reviewed by Gertler (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler
(1995). And the idea that the wealth distribution can have a ﬁrst-order ef-
fect on aggregate output via the eﬃciency with which capital is used was
formalised in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998). The contri-
bution of this paper is to put these elements together in an internally consis-
tent, tractable model. The analysis has shown that the credit mechanims can
amplify shocks and make them highly persistent, so that small, temporary
disturbances to productivity or monetary policy have large and persistent
eﬀects on output. The basic mechanism is that, because highly productive
agents ﬁnd it optimal to borrow from less productive agents, they are lever-
aged. Any aggregate disturbance will aﬀect borrowers’ net worth more than
lenders’ net worth due to leverage, and so will aﬀect the wealth distribution.
The most productive agents will end up holding less of the economy’s produc-
tive resources, which lowers aggregate output and further depresses the price
of capital, exacerbating the shift in the wealth distribution. It takes time for
the most productive agents to rebuild their share of wealth, and output there-
fore deviates from its steady-state level for many periods. I have also shown
that sticky prices not only dampen the output eﬀect of productivity shocks,
which is not new, but that they bring the output eﬀect of productivity shocks
closer to eﬃcient levels - which is new. This casts new light on the trade-
oﬀ between output and inﬂation variability that systematic monetary policy
aims to balance. The ﬂexible-price response of the economy to productivity
shocks is no longer eﬃcient. And by allowing some inﬂation variability, mon-
etary policy can achieve lower output variability around the eﬃcient level.
These ideas are pursued further in a another paper (Vlieghe (2004)), where
I consider how monetary policy should optimal react to productivity shocks,
given the trade-oﬀ created by credit frictions.
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Figure 3: Response to productivity shock (staggered pricing model)
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